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Hurry Up and Have an Accident:
Comprehensive General Liability
Contract Standard Pollution
Exclusion Clause Includes a
Temporal Element
Charter Oil Company v. American Employers' Insurance'
by Kevin Murphy
1. INTRODUCTION
In Charter Oil Company v. American
Employers' Insurance Company, Charter
appealed the lower court's decision, seek-
ing coverage based on comprehensive
liability insurance. Applying Missouri
law, the Court of Appeals found that the
insurance companies did not have to
cover Charter's CERCLA costs because
the insurance contract only covered
"sudden and accidental" environmental
damage. One of a multitude of courts to
interpret this "pollution exclusion clause,"
the D. C. Circuit held that under Missouri
law, the "pollution exclusion clause"
would be interpreted in favor of the insur-
ers. However, it is still unclear whether
Missouri state courts would decide the
case as the D. C. Circuit predicted.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1971, Independent Petrochemical
Corporation (IPC), a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary of plaintiff/appellant Charter Oil
(Charter), hired independent contractor
Russell Bliss to dispose of hazardous
waste materials. 2 IPC disposed of the
waste as a courtesy to IPC's customer,
Northeastern Pharmaceutical and
Chemical Company (NAPACCO).3 NA-
PACCO's waste contained dioxin,
which, in sufficient concentrations, has
been found to be harmful to humans,
plants, and animals.
Bliss did not appropriately dispose of
the hazardous waste.6  Five times be-
tween February, 1991, and October,
1971, Bliss moved the waste to Fronte-
nac, Missouri, where he mixed it with
waste oil and stored it. 7  Later Bliss
sprayed the dioxin laced waste oil as a
dust suppressant at various locations
throughout Missouri.'
When the government and public be-
come aware of the dioxin contamination
at the sites Bliss sprayed, IPC faced class
action suits from the United States and the
State of Missouri.9  In addition, over
1,600 claimants in 57 separate actions,
filed civil suits alleging bodily injury and
property damage from the dioxin contami-
nated soil.1 o The individuals requested
aggregate relief of $4 billion, and puni-
tive damages of $4 billion." All of the
private suits, except one, had been settled
by the time the trial court rendered its
opinion in January, 1994.12 Settlements
with the United States and the State of
Missouri were also awaiting court
approval. "
IPC sought coverage from insurance
policies14 which had been purchased
' 69 F.3d 1160 (D. C. Cir. 1995).
2 
. Id.
3 Id. of 1 162.
4 Independent Petrochemical Corp. (IPC) v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 842 F. Supp. 575 (D.D.C.
Employers' Ins. Co., 69 F.3d 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
5 Charter, 69 F.3d. at 1162.
1994), off'd sub nom.Charter Oil Co. v. American
6 The trial court and appellate cases leave some doubt as to whether Bliss acted knowingly. The appellate opinion suggested that Bliss did not know that the
waste oil he sprayed contained dioxin. See Charter, 69 F.3d at 1162 ("Bliss Oil's president tasted the oil to check its suitability for other uses and found the flavor
fit, Bliss sprayed it as a dust suppressant . . . throughout Missouri . . . . The waste oil turned out to contain dioxin .... ) The trial court's more detailed opinion
indicated that Bliss mixed hazardous waste with oil before spraying it in Missouri. Charter, 69 F.3d at 1162. However, the trial court held that it did not need to
decide if Bliss polluted intentionally, but only that he intentionally sprayed the contaminated oil. IPC, 842 F. Supp. at 584.
7 IPC, 842 F. Supp. at 676.
8 Id. EPA found the soil to be contaminated in 29 different locations as a result of Bliss's spraying. These locations included Times Beach, Shenandoah
Stables, Timberline Stables, Bubbling Springs Stable, Saddle and Spur Club, Rosati/Piazza Road, Frontenac, Quail Run, Castlewood/Sontog Road,
Highway 1 00/Erxleben, East North Street, Lacy Monor/Sandcut Road, Bliss Farm/Mid-America Arena, Bull Moose Tube Company, Hamill Transfer Company,
Jones Truck Line, Overnight Transport/P.L.E, Southern Cross Lumber, Arkansas Best Freight, Bonifield Brother Trucking, Community Christian Church,
Manchester Methodist Church, Baxter Garden Center, Access Road to Old Highway 141, East Texas Freight, Bristol Steel, Hellwig Fruit Market,
Minker/Stout/Romaine Creek, and Southwestern Bell. Id. at 676 n.3.
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between 1971, the year when IPC
agreed to assist NEPACCO in disposing
of the hazardous waste, and 1983, the
filing of Charter Oil.15 Charter sued the
insurers in November 1983, seeking a
declaratory judgment that would force
them to indemnify Charter for Bliss' oil
spraying activities.' 6  The defendants in
that action were the twenty-three different
insurers that had issued IPC sixty-seven
primary and excess liability policies. 7 In
February, 1991, the court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of defendants, in
cases, where New York law controlled.' 8
At trial, the court granted summary
judgment for those defendants over whom
Missouri law was controlling.' Summary
judgment was granted because each of
the defendant insurance companies had
standardpollution exclusion clauses in their
insurance contracts that did not allow re-
covery for releases of pollution.20 These
pollution exclusion clauses, however, con-
tained exceptions that permitted recovery
for "sudden and accidental" discharges
of pollutants.2" The specific prevision at
issue stated that the insurance did not
cover:
[blodily injury or property
damage arising out of the dis-
charge, dispersal, release or es-
cape of smoke, vapors, soot,
fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemi-
cals, liquids or gases, waste ma-
terials or other irritants,
contaminants or pollutants into or
upon land, the atmosphere or
any watercourse or body of wa-
ter, but this exclusion does not
apply if such discharge, disper-
sal, release or escape is sudden
and accidental.22
Three of the four types of pollution exclu-
sion clauses read the same as the one
above.23 The remaining form of insurance
contract, issued by Travelers, included an
exception that allowed for indemnification
if the pollution was neither "expected" nor
"intended." 2 The parties agreed that the
"expected nor intended" language was
functional equivalent to "accidental." 25
The Travelers contract did not include lan-
guage corresponding to the other con-
tracts' use of the word "sudden."26
Charter argued that the "sudden and
accidental" clause was ambiguous, and
as such should be interpreted against the
insurance companies, the parties who
drafted the contract. 27 Accordingly, Char-
ter argued, the insurers would, therefore,
have to indemnify them for the remedia-
tion costs associated with the cleanup of
the dioxin.28 The trial court refused to ac-
cept this argument holding that under Mis-
souri law the insurance companies had no
duty to indemnify. 29  The D. C. Circuit
Court of Appeals also found in favor of
the insurance companies.30  That court
held that under Missouri law the phrase
"sudden and accidental" was not suffi-
ciently ambiguous and that the counterbal-
ancing public policy considerations of
allowing insurance companies to reserve




General Liability (CGL) insurance policies
are designed to protect businesses against
liability to third parties.32 Available for all
types of commercial ventures, CGLs re-
quire the insurer to defend the insured if
litigation arises, and indemnify the insured
for any payment resulting from a business
1A Id.
15 Id.
1 Charter Oil Co. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 69 F.3d 1160, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
7 IPC, 842 F. Supp at 576. Defendants in this action were.Aetna Casualty and Surety Company (Aetna), American Employers' Insurance Company (American
Employers), American Home Assurance Company (American Home), American Re-Insurance Company (American Re-Insurance), Continental Casualty Company,
Continental Insurance Company, Employers Commercial Union Insurance Company, First State Insurance Company, Harbor Insurance Company, Hartford
Accident and Indemnity Co., Insurance Company of North America, The Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania, North Star Reinsurance Company,
Stonewall Insurance Company, The Travelers Indemnity Company (Travelers), Unigard Security Insurance Company, and Certain London Market Defendants (the
London Defendants). Id.
" IPC, 842 F. Supp at 576.
Id.
Charter, 69 F.3d at 1162.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 1163.
23 Id. The trial court referred to this form of exclusion as the "domestic insurers exclusion." IPC, 842 F. Supp. at 577. The trial court also mentioned what it
referred to as the "London exclusion" and the "INA exclusion." Id. Charter and defendants agreeded that the domestic insurers exclusion, the London exclusion,
and the INA exclusion should all be interpreted identicallybased on the theory that the word "accidental" is nearly identical to the words "expected and intended"
in some of the insurers' contracts. Id.
24 Independent Petrochemical Corp. (IPC v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 842 F. Supp. 575, 577 (D.D.C. 1994).
25 Id
26 Id.
27 Id. at 576.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 585.
30 Charter Oil Co. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 69 F.3d 1160, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
31 Id. at 1163.
1 Carl A. Salisbury, Pollution Liability Insurance Coverage, The Standard-Form Pollution Exclusion, and the Insurance Industry: A Case Study in Collective
Amnesia, 21 Evn. L. 357, 359 n.6 (19911.
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loss. 3  Under a CGL policy, the insurer
has five obligations: 1) promoting safety
and reducing claims; 2) investigating
claims; 3) defending policy holders in
suits; 4) indemnifying policy holders when
obligated; 5) helping to mitigate losses. 34
CGLs are standardized in order to
make them easier to interpret.35 The idea
is that once courts have interpreted a
given policy, an insurance company can
plan financially for the future because the
company knows what the likelihood is that
it will have to pay out on the policy.36 A
trade organization, Insurance Service Of-
fice (ISO), drafts many of the CGL stan-
dard policies which are used by almost
every major American insurance com-
pany.3 1 ISO was responsible for drafting
the standard pollution exclusion that was
the subject of the instant case.3 a Gener-
ally, the insured purchases the policy from
a broker without having any input on the
language of the policy and in many cases
not seeing the policy contract until they
have already paid for it.39
During the last two decades potential
environmental liability for business has in-
creased to the level that coverage has be-
come essential to the survival of many
business.40  Business owners who have
purchased CGL policies to guard against
liability have turned to the insurance poli-
cies they purchased during the seventies
and early eighties for environmental cover-
age.4' Insurance companies, however,
often refuse to indemnify, arguing that the
"sudden and accidental" clause only cov-
ers pollution that is both "unexpected and
unintended" and abrupt, a burden few
insureds can overcome. 42 This, "sudden
and accidental" exclusionary clause was
found in practicallyevery CGL between
1973 and 1985. 43
The ambiguous nature of the "sudden
and accidental" language has prompted
numerous lawsuits against various insur-
ance companies throughout the years.
Courts, however, have failed to agree on
a consistent interpretation of the lan-
guage." The fact that almost every CGL
purchased between 1978 and 1985
contains this same "sudden and
accidental" exclusionary clause makes the
need for a uniform interpretation all the
more important.45  Apparently in an at-
tempt to establish more predictability, the
ISO replaced the standard pollution exclu-
sion with an "absolute pollution exclu-
sion."46 Businesses, however, still face
unpredictable litigation under the old stan-
dard pollution exclusion for pollution
events that occurred during the years
where the older pollution exclusion clause
was used.47
As the interpretation of the pollution
exclusion clause began to be litigated,
courts unanimously held that "sudden and
accidental" meant unexpected, unin-
tended, and abruptly beginning. 4  The
first case to interpret the exclusion clause
was Lansco, Inc. v. Department of Environ-
mental Protection.49 Vandals had opened
the valve of an oil storage tank, spilling oil
onto Lansco's property, and a nearby
river.50 Even though the actual pollution
Sharon M. Murphy, The "Sudden and Accidental" Exception to the Pollution Exclusion Clause in Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policies: The
Gordian Knot of Environmental Liability, 45 VAND. L. REV. 161, 163. Usually, CGL policies promise "'to pay on behalf of the insured all sums ... [it is] legally to
pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which the insurance applies caused by an occurrence ... "' Id. at n.7.
See Salisbury, supra note 32, at 359 n.6.
3s See Murphy, supra note 33, at 164.
36 Id.
17 Id. at 164 n. 17.
" Nancer Ballard and Peter M. Manus, Clearing Muddy Waters: Anatomy of the Comprehensive General Liability Pollution Exclusion, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 610,
625 n.59 (1990).
SId. at 621.
o Id. at 612. The increase in of liability is in large part due to the passage of environmental statutes such as CERC[A.
41 Id.
2 Charter Oil Co. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 69 F.3d 1160, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
4 Murphy, supra note 33, at 167. In 1985, because insurance companies were facing overwhelming liability costs, the ISO removed all coverage for pollution
based injuries. Id.
" Ballard and Manus, supro note 38, at 612. The authors found at least one court which had taken note of the smorgasbord of judicial viewpoints:
There is a plethora of authority (on the pollution exclusion] from jurisdictions throughout the United States which, depending on the facts presented an the
allegations of the underlying complaints, go "both ways" on the issues presented today. The cases swim the reporters like fish in a lake. The Defendants
would have this Court pull up its line with a trout on the hook, and argue that the lake is full of trout only, when in fact the water is full of bass, salmon,
and sunfish, too. Id at n.7, (citing Pepper's Steel and Alloys, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 668 F. Supp. 1541, 1549-50 (S.D Fla.
1987).
4 Id.
46 Amy Timmer, Are They Lying Now or Were They Lying Then? The Insurance Industry's Ambiguous Pollution Exclusion: Why the Insurer, and Not the Innocent
Insured, Should Pay for Pollution Caused by Prior landowners, 46 BAYLOR L. REv. 355, 357 n.3 (1994). The post-1 986 exclusion now reads:
It is agreed that this policy does not apply to personal injury or property damage arising out of the contamination of the environment by pollutants
introduced at any time into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water course or body of water or aquifer. This exclusion applies whether or not the
contamination is introduced into the environment intentionally or accidentally or gradually or suddenly and whether or not the insured or any other person
or organization is responsible for the contamination. Id. at 375 n.72.
A See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
As Ballard and Manus, supra note 38, at 633. For this initial section, I adopt the cases and organization chosen by the author.
A 350 A.2d 520 (NJ. Super. 1975), off'd 368 A.2d 363 (NJ. Super. Ci. App. Div. 1976), cert. denied, 372 A.2d 322 (NJ. 1977).
Id.atS21.
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wasintentional, an act of vandalism, the
court held that the pollution was "sudden
and accidental" from Lansco's perspec-
tive." Based on dictionary definitions of
both accidental and sudden, the court de-
cided that the clause must exclude cover-
age for pollution that is unexpected and
unintended.52 Pollution by third party van-
dals was not intended or expected by the
insured, so the court held that the exclu-
sion clause did not apply in Lasco's situa-
tion.5' In 1982, in Jackson Township
Municipal Utilities Authority v. Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co.,54 for the first
time a court held that an insured could
recover if the damages were unexpected,
although intended.55 This was a develop-
ment from previous decisions which had
allowed coverage in cases where the pol-
lution was unintended.56 In this case, the
court found waste that seeped from an
intentionally made landfill to be insur-
able.57 Rather than ending the effective-
ness of the pollution exclusion clause as
had been predicted, Jackson actually cre-
ated a backlash that caused subsequent
courts to find for the insurers.58
In Waste Management of Carolinas,
Inc. v. Peerless Insurance Ca. 59 , the court
found for the insurers on the basis that a
"sudden and accidental" pollution must
be instantaneous,' A waste hauler
dumped hazardous waste into a landfill,
which subsequently seeped into the envi-
ronment.6 ' The court ruled that, to avoid
a redundancy in the "sudden and acci-
dental" language, "occurrence," which
refers to the "sudden and accidental" pol-
lution, must mean "instantaneous." 62 The
court observed that the dumping may
have happened suddenly, but the harmful
seepage from the dump leached slowly
into the groundwater.6' The court held
that the slow, harmful seepage into
groundwater, even if unexpected and un-
intended, was precluded by the pollution
exclusion clause.6 Thus, insureds could
not recover.65
One case often cited by insureds is,
Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co." This case illustrates howdivided the
courts were after Peerless. The court in
Claussen observed the conflict between
courts that had interpreted "sudden and
accidental" to simply mean unexpected,
and courts that had assigned the phrase
the additional meaning of "abrupt. "67
The court used ordinary dictionary defini-
tions to resolve the conflict.68  The court
found that the word sudden could mean
both "unexpected" and "abrupt,"69  al-
though the primary definition of sudden
seemed to be "unexpected". 70 Some dic-
tionaries, however, also included "abrupt"
within the definition.7 1 The court noted
that:
[Il]t is indeed difficult to think of
'sudden" without a temporal con-
notation: a sudden flash, a sud-
den burst of speed, a sudden
bang. But, on reflection one re-
alizes that, even in its popular
usage, "sudden" does not usually
describe the duration of an event,
but rather its unexpectedness: a
sudden storm, a sudden turn in
the road, sudden death. Even
when used to describe the onset
of an event, the word has an
elastic temporal connotation that
varies with expectations: Sud-
denly, it's spring.72
Because the court recognized that there
was more than one plausible definition for
the pollution exclusion clause, the
Claussen court followed the rule that am-
biguous contract terms are to be construed
in favor of the insured.73  The court dis-
missed Aetna's argument that when the
contact was entered into no one antici-
pated the extent of pollution liability that
lay ahead.' The court observed that in-
surance companies must bear the brunt of
si Id. at 524.
52 Id.
s3 Id.
- 451 A.2d 990 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982).
Is Id. at 995.
56 Id. at 993-94.
s7 Id. at 994.
s" Ballard and Manus, supro note 38, at 636.
5 340 S.E.2d 374 (1986).
6 Id. at 380.
61 Id. at 374.
62 Id. at 381. Ballard and Manus call this a misconstruction of the word "occurrence," and believe the ruling has resulted in successful arguments by insurers for
the last decade. Ballard and Manus, supro note 38, at 640.
61 Peerless, 340 S.E.2d at 340.
6 Id.
6 Id.
6 380 S.E.2d 686 (1989).
6 Id. at 688.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. See WEBSTERS' THIRD NEw INTERNAIlONAL DicTioNARY 2284 (10th ed. 1995). See also BLACK'S [Aw DIc1oNmARY 1284 (6th ed. 1990).
"i Cloussen, 380 S.E.2d at 688.
72 Id.
3 Id.
74 Id. ot 689.
MELPR 225
Vol. 3 * No. 4
any lack of clarity.' 5 In addition, the court
found that the interpretation advanced by
Claussen was not contrary to that given
by insurers at the time the clause was cre-
ated, that in most cases the "sudden and
accidental" clause would still make only
intentional polluters liable.' 6
The court in Morton, Inc. v. General
Accident Insurance Company of Amer-
ica77 also found in favor of the insureds,
but based its decision on the representa-
tions made by the insurance companies at
the time the standard pollution exclusion
clause was adopted, rather than the lan-
guage itself.' The court overturned a
lower court decision and held that
"sudden and accidental" included a tem-
poral element.' The Morton court said
that it would be unfair to insureds to inter-
pret "sudden and accidental" beyond sim-
ply "unexpected and unintended" in light
ofrepresentations the insurance industry
made to state regulators.80  The court
noted that in a non-regulatory context, it
regularly construed misrepresentations by
insurers about what the policy covered as
grounds to estop the insurer from asserting
that the contract did provide suc cover-
age.i Because the insurance company
had made misrepresentations to the state
regulatory agency and others, the court
had no trouble finding in favor of the
insureds.82
In Missouri, the principal case inter-
preting the "sudden and accidental" lan-
guage is Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v.
General Dynamics83 This is the only
Eighth Circuit case to use Missouri con-
tract law to interpret this language. At the
trial court level, the court held for in-
sureds.84 That court pointed out that Mis-
souri low required provisions designed to
restrict coverage of insureds to be con-
strued against the insurer, with the insurer
bearing the burden of expressing the limi-
tation in clear and unambiguous terms. 85
In addition, the court noted that Missouri
courts give insurance contracts their plain
meaning, and when there is duplicity, in-
distinctness or uncertainty of meaning, or
where the policy is reasonably and fairly
open to different constructions, an ambigu-
ity is created.86 Furthermore, the court
held that both the insured and insurer's
definitions were reasonable interpretations
of the "sudden and accidental' lan-
guage. ' Since an ambiguity existed, the
contract had to be construed in favor of
the insureds, as controlled by Missouri
law." The trial court also observed that
the drafting history of the pollution exclu-
sion clause illustrates the insurance
companies intended "sudden and acci-
dental" to mean "unexpected and
unintended" without any temporal
connotations. 89
On appeal, the decision in favor of
the insureds was overturned. In relevant
part, the court noted that other courts have
been split on this issue; many courts have
found for insureds holding "sudden and
accidental" means only unexpected,
while others have held "sudden and acci-
dental" to include a temporal element
which includes coverage from
non-"gradual" pollution." The appellate
court chose the second view.91  Unless
the pollution was both unexpected and
unintended, as well as sudden, General
Dynamics would not be covered. 92
In deciding for the insurers, the appel-
late court in General Dynamics also
pointed out that Missouri requires that in-
surance contracts be given their plain
meaning. 93 However, the court noted that
all of the terms in the contract must be
given meaning.9' The General Dynamics
court based this view on what the Charter
court referred to as the anti-redundancy
canon.9' In Missouri, courts interpret am-
biguous terms with two possible construc-
tions to exclude any meaning that creates
a "redundant, illusory, absurd, and there-
fore unreasonable" result. 96
General Dynamics recognized that
courts generally agree that "accidental"
75 Id.
76 Id.
" 629 A.2d 831 ( NJ. 1993).
78 Id. at 873.
7 Id. at 847.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 875.
83 968 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1992).
" Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 783 F. Supp. 1199 lE.D. Mo. 1991), off'd in port, rev'd in part, and remanded 968 F.2d 707
(8th Cir. 1992)..
8s Aetnaoat 1207.
a Id. at 1208 (citing Nixon v. Life Investors Ins. Co., 675 S.W.2d 676, 679 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Pearce v. General American Life Ins. Co., 637 F.2d
536, 539 (8th Cir. 1980)).
87 Aetna, 783 F. Supp. at 1208.
88 Id. at 1209.
89 Id.
* General Dynamics, 968 F.2d at 710.
91 Id.
9 Id.
9 Id. (citing Continental Ins. Co. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 842 F.2d 977, 985 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988)).
' General Dynamics, 968 F.2d at 710 (citing Harnden v. Continental Ins. Co. 612 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Mo. Cf. App. 1981)). See supro notes 66-76 and
accompanying text (Cloussen makes no mention of the rule that requires all insurance contract terms be given meaning).
" Charter Oil Co. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 69 F.3d 1160, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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means unexpected.97' If accidental
means "unexpected," then to interpret the
whole phrase "sudden and accidentaV' as
"unexpected" leaves the word "sudden"
without any real meaning.98  Thus,
"sudden" must mean abrupt, because oth-
erwise, the word would be superfluous.'
Therefore, the court held, the insurer does
not have to cover General Dynamics, be-
cause the pollution exclusion clause does
not apply to cases where the pollution is
not unexpected and abrupt."
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The court began by noting that there
have been no Missouri decisions interpret-
ing the "sudden and accidental" lan-
guage of a CGL pollution exclusion
clause.'' Because the Missouri Supreme
Court refuses to accept cases certified to it
from federal courts,' 02 the court was left to
interpret Missouri law without state
guidance. 103
First, the court set out Charter's argu-
ments.'" Charter argued that the "sudden
and accidental" language of the CGL
was facially ambiguous; that it could be
interpreted to mean "unexpected and un-
intended" or "unexpected, unintended,
and abrupt."' 05 Charter, favoring the for-
mer interpretation, argued that under Mis-
souri low, ambiguous insurance contracts
should be construed in a light most favor-
able to the insured.'" Thus, went Char-
ter's reasoning, the facially ambiguous
language, "sudden and accidental,"
should be interpreted to favor cover-
age.'0 7 In the alternative, Charter argued
that the phrase, "sudden and accidental,"
constituted a latent ambiguity.10" In the
absence of extrinsic evidence in favor of
the insurer's, Charter argued that the la-
tent ambiguity should also be construed in
their favor.'"
The court, addressing Charter's facial
ambiguity argument, observed that Mis-
souri applied an "anti-redundancy
canon."ii 0  Under the anti-redundancy
canon, Missouri requires that all words in
an insurance contract be given mean-
ing.i' Based on the Eighth Circuit inter-
pretation of "sudden and accidental"
under Missouri law in Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co. v. General Dynamics Corp.," 2
the court decided that the trial court had
correctly applied the anti-redundancy the-
ory to Charter's arguments."'
The court observed that, taken to-
gether, the words sudden and accidental
must have a temporal element because to
hold otherwise would make the word
"accidental" an ambiguity after the word
"sudden.""' The court made this obser-
vation after analyzing the competing defi-
nitions of the word sudden.'' 5 The court,
after defining "accidental" to mean
"unexpected,"' 16 noted that Charter's
definitions for both "sudden" and
"unexpected" contained the same mean-
ing: unexpected."' To allow "sudden"
to mean only "unexpected" would create
aredundancy since both "sudden" and
"accidental" would mean unexpected."'
The anti-redundancy canon requires that
"sudden" be defined to eliminate the re-
dundancy."' Thus, "sudden" must mean
"abrupt," or "quick."' 20 Returning to the
whole phrase, the court held that "sudden
and accidental" meant that the pollution
must be both unexpected and temporally
abrupt.' 2' To hold otherwise, the court
said, would mean that insurance
* Standard Meat Co. v. Taco Kid of Springfield, Inc., 554 S.W.2d 592, 596 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).




101 Charter, 69 F.3d at 1163.
12 Id. See Harber v. Altec Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 339, 340 (8th Cir. 1993); Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 944 F.2d 940, 944(D.C. Cir. 1991). See Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 380 S.E.2d 686 (1989) (providing an example of the certification process in Georgia).
103 Charter Oil Co. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 69 F.3d 1160, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
i0 Id.
105 Id.
i0 Id. See Peters v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co., 853 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Mo. 1993), Krombach v. Mayflower Ins. Co., 827 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Mo.
1992).





112 Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. General Dynamics, 968 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1992).
" Charter, 69 F.3d at 1163.
"" Id. The court based this interpretation on General Dynamics, which also interpreted "sudden and accidental" as it thought Missouri courts would have
interpreted these terms. General Dynamics, 968 F.2d at 707.
's Charter Oil Co. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 69 F.3d 1160, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1995).




'2 Id. The court noted that, in Missouri, "all terms of an insurance contract be given meaning." General Dynamics, 968 F.2d at 710.
121 Charter, 69 F.3d at 1163.
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companies would find it impossible to spe-
cifically exclude one member of a set of
closely related circumstances because in-
sureds would be able to choose redun-
dant meanings to limit the scope of
specific exclusions. 122
In addition, the court noted that under
Missouri law, policy contracts are given
their plain meaning, or the meaning that
would be "ordinarily understood by the
layman who bought and paid for the pol-
icy."123 The court cited to decisions of
other jurisdictions that have also decided
that "sudden" means "abrupt."l 24 Specifi-
cally, the court noted that the Ninth Cir-
cuit, interpreting California low in Smith v.
Hughes Aircraft Co., 125 and the Tenth Cir-
cuit, interpreting Utah law in Hartford Ac-
cident & Indemnity Co. v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 126 reached the
conclusion that sudden and abrupt were
synonyms in the "ordinary and popu-
lar"' 27 sense. 128
The court distinguished the instant case
from others that had interpreted "sudden"
to mean only "unexpected."' Citing
examples from Cloussen v. Aetna Casu-
alty & Surety Co. 's,"ao the court noted13 1
that a "sudden" bend in the road is still
sudden for a driver on a familiar road,
that a "sudden" storm is not really sudden,
but also abrupt, and that a "sudden"
death usually does not describe a linger-
ing death, but one that happens abruptly
in time.132
The court then considered the purpose
of the policy's "sudden and accidental"
terminology.13 ' The court pointed out that
insurance companies may have intended
the "sudden" terminology as a back up to
the usual "unexpected and unintended"
language of occurrence contracts be-
cause pollution over a long duration is
morelikely to be intended by the in-
sured. 3" This model of unintentional pol-
lution become less fashionable with the
advent of CERCLA-style liability, but it
likely informed the insurers intent to rule
out pollution that was intentional.135
The court observed that the policy lan-
guage may have also been intended to
banish a moral hazard.136  If potential
polluters knew that their insurance would
cover them if they were sued for pollution,
they would have no incentive to dispose
of waste properly." Both insurer and
insured are interested in excluding all but
accidental pollution in order to limit insur-
ance liability, thus lowering insurers costs,
and thus lowering insureds' premiums. 138
To interpret "sudden" as "abrupt" added
another limiting factor guaranteeing that
fewer intended pollution events are cov-
ered by insurers. 139 Therefore, the court
noted that insurers could have plausibly
been interested in controlling moral haz-
ard, thereby benefiting both insured and
insurers. 140
The court acknowledged that sudden-
ness was an imperfect mechanism for rul-
ing out unexpected harm. 141 Indeed, the
court observed that suddenness has little to
nothing to do with whether the harm is
unexpected. 14 2  However, the court did
not require that suddenness, which was
but a proxy for unexpected harm, fit per-
fectly with that intent.' 43
Charter argued that even if the
"sudden and accidental" clause was not
facially ambiguous, the phrase had a la-
tent ambiguity that could only be resolved
by looking to information outside the con-
tract.144  This latent ambiguity, Charter
argued, stemmed from "the insurers' prior
claims behavior and representations made
to state insurance regulators." 14 5  The
court pointed out that once the latent am-
biguity is established, Missouri allows a
broad range of extrinsic evidence to be
admitted to resolve it.14 6 This evidence
includes the circumstances surrounding the
initial formation of the contract and the
behavior of the parties with respect to
122 Id. at 1165.
Charter, 69 F.3d at 1165 (citing Robin v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., Inc., 637 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Mo. 1982)).
Id.
22 F.3d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1993).
962 F.2d 1484, 1487, 1489-90 (10th Cir. 1992).
Charter, 69 F.3d at 1165 (citing Smith, 22 F.3d at 1437).
Id.
Id.
Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 380 S.E.2d 686, 688 (1989).
Charter Oil Co. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 69 F.3d 1160, 1165-66 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
Id.
Id. at 1166.
Id. (citing Kenneth S. Abraham, ENVIONMENTAL bABILRY INSURANCE LAW 153 (1991)).











146 Id. at 1168.
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other, similar contracts.' 47  liability under statutes such as CERC[A.' the "sudden" language, could insur
Charter first argued that insurer's initial The court dismissed Charter's other at- Chorter if the discharge was accide
payment to Charter of $2.8 million meant tempts at showing a latent ambiguity, find- tal.16 3  Since Charter did not ci
that insurer's policy hadbeen given a ing that statements in internal Aetna "inescapable" authority, and since Cha
practical construction requiring payment of memoranda and insurance industry publi- ter's strategy may have been
the rest of the liability.'14 The insurers ar- cations failed to show that adding "sandbag" insurers into not dealing full
gued that any such payment should not "sudden" was anything but an attempt to with the argument, the court deemed thi
bind them to a single interpretation for all broaden the exclusion. 156 part of the argument waived."
similar clams.' 4 ' The court, agreeing In a final effort, Charter argued that
withe the insurers, held that to follow insurer's misrepresentations to regulators V. COMMENT
Charter's logic would require insurers to should bar enforcement of the exclusion In Missouri, the "anti-redundanc
make an overly thorough investigation of clause on the basis of public Policy.' 57  canon" is the key to deciding in favor c
the claim before paying out even small The court reasoned that, since Genera/ the insurance companies. Besides the in
amounts, because payment of a small, Dynamics did not make a reasoned in- stant case and General Dynamics, a
undeserving claim would bar the insurer quiry into the public policy argument, it Delaware court also found that the pollu
from later denying coverage. 50  could not dismiss the argument outright. 5 8  tion exclusion clause contained an ele
The court likewise dismissed Charter's However, the court noted that the Missouri ment of abruptness based on its use of th
claim that American Employers' Insurance had neither legislative nor judicial doc- Missouri anti-redundancy rule.' 65  In thE
created an ambiguity contemporaneous trines that would allow for consideration instant case, Missouri's anti-redundanc
with drafting the exclusion clause in vari- of misconduct before regulators, and that canon appears to shortcut most argument
ous fora.' 5 1 For example, Charter even if Missouri had such a law, Charter against construing the pollution exclusior
claimed that, at that time, several insur- would have failed to establish any con- clause against insurers. However, Mis
ance company heads had characterized vincing discrepancy between insurers souri state courts have not yet ruled on
159the "sudden" language as clarification to statements and the pollution exclusion, whether pollution exclusion clause is enthe previous "unintended and unex- Having decided that "sudden" must forceable in Missouri. Nevertheless, be-
pected" meaning of the clause.'"' mean abrupt, the court then decided that cause of inconsistencies created between
Charter claimed that the representations Bliss's sprayings were not abrupt.'6 The the Charter court's over-application of the
created an ambiguity because insureds court dismissed Charter's contention that anti-redundancy canon to the pollution ex-
were now unsure of whether "unexpected the discreet 30-40 minute sprayings were clusion clause and the intent of the parties
and unintended" was going to be abrupt asnonsensical. 6 ' The court again involved, one might argue that Missouri
interpreted as it had been before.'55 The noted that "sudden" was but an impre- should not use the anti-redundancy rule to
court decided in favor of the insurers.' 54  cise, but enforceable, proxy for find against the insureds in cases
The court noted that the "clarifying" "unexpected and unintended. interpreting the pollution exclusion
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c56 Idf at 1169.
157 Id.
1 Id. al 1"69-1s170 uciting Abex, 790 F.b2d n a125e.
'n Charter, 69 F.a3d at 11 70.
160 Id.
161 Id. The court observed that if it allowed for Charter's argument, it would be forced to concede that two months of spraying would constitute non-abrupt
spraying, while the same spraying with 5 minute breaks would be abrupt, and intemnifiable. Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
Hwe Idh at 1171.
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it less likely that the first typical argument
against construing the pollution exclusion
clause against insurers will be accepted.
In Charter, insureds made most of the ar-
guments that insureds had successfully ar-
gued in other jurisdictions. For example,
the argument from Claussen that the plain
language of "sudden" and "accidental,"
can simply mean unexpected' 6 7 is dis-
puted by the Missouri anti-redundancy
rule.' 6 s Though definitions of the common
usage of the word "sudden" seems to
mean unexpected, the court resolved the
ambiguity by pointing out that it would be
redundant for the words to mean the same
thing, thus sudden must connote abrupt.' 69
The anti-redundancy rule is misapplied
because of the great weight given to the
rule in deciding the meaning of the
clause. The case that is originally cited in
the General Dynamics case, Harnden v.
Continental Ins. Co."7 o, gives the rule that
no clause of an insurance contract should
perish by a court's construction of the con-
tracts terms. 7' That case is distinguish-
able because it dealt with longer clauses
that would have been completely elimi-
nated by the construction advocated,
rather, as in a pollution exclusion clause,
the repetition of a term for clarity. In other
non-insurance contract cases in Missouri,
there is an equivalent rule to the anti-
redundancy canon which states that the
"more probable and reasonable of two
available constructions should be utilized
to the exclusion of the one which pro-
duces a 'redundant, illusory, absurd, and
therefore unreasonable result.""l 72 How-
ever, it appears that this rule is only used
after the court has looked into extrinsic evi-
dence of the parties intentions to resolve
the ambiguity.173  In addition, the in-
sured's arguments do not seem absurd or
illusory. It does not seem absurd that the
insurance drafters may have intended two
words to mean the same thing: unex-
pected and unintended. If anything, it is
insurer's argument that adds term - here,
a - third meaning from two words:
"sudden."
The court's explanation of the imper-
fect "proxy" of the pollution exclusion
clause also seems troublesome. One of
the typical arguments of insureds is that
the pollution exclusion clause was in-
tended to disallow coverage for insureds
who intentionally polluted their surround-
ings, and avoid the "moral hazard" of
indemnifying insureds who purposefully
foul the environment. Charter acknowl-
edged that "suddenness" was an imper-
fect mechanism that had "little bearing"
on whether the harm was expected or in-
tended." Nonetheless, the court noted
that the proxy did not have to make a
"perfect fit" with the insurers' goal of
excluding intentional pollution, but only
had to approximate the desires of the par-
ties to exclude intentional pollution. 175
The absence of "perfect fit" was not rea-
son enough to "distort" the meaning of the
contract.176 It seems contradictory for the
court to have expended considerable ef-
fort resolving an redundancy by defining
"sudden and accidental" as "abrupt, un-
expected, and unintended," only to later
point out that that the real intent of the par-
ties was to rule out only unexpected and-
unintended harm. Perhaps the court,
constricted by the Eighth Circuit's use of
the anti-redundancy rule, felt that it had no
choice but to use the rule to decide in fa-
vor of the insurers, but had made note that
the rule created a troublesome result. The
court's discussion of the proxy problem
illustrates the problematic effect of decid-
ing a pollution exclusion clause solely on
the basis of the anti-redundancy rule.
In Charter, insureds showed evidence
that indicated that the original intent of the
parties had been to exclude coverage for
those pollution events that were not unex-
pected and unintended.177 With its dis-
cussion of proxies, the court
acknowledged that the intent of the parties
had been to exclude coverage for events
only if they were expected and intended,
without the temporal requirement of
abruptness. 171 It seems that perhaps a
'6 Commentators have written extensively in support of both sides. Arguments are often based on public policy grounds. Arguing in favor of the insurance
companies is Murphy, who based her view on the familiar moral hazard argument and also argued that the insurance companies would face too great of on
unexpected financial burden if they were to have to cover insureds under the pollution exclusion clause. See generally Murphy, supro note 33. For an industry that
conducts business by calculating risks, the insurance companies' miscalculation with the pollution exclusion clause could be hard on the industry, and thus increase
premiums for others.
Several scholars argue in favor of insureds. Timmer argued that innocent and unintentional polluters have been left in the cold by insurance companies, that
insurance companies themselves would have considered insureds in cases like the instant case to be covered when the clause was drafted, and that because the
nature of the business of insurance companies uniquely equips them for calculated risk taking, they should bear the cost of clean up. It also seems likely that finding
for coverage would lessen the risk of government paying clean-up bills when the costs are too high for the actual unintentional polluter. See generally Timmer, su-
pro note 46.
Because insureds have lost all the cases that apply Missouri law, this article seeks to argue in favor of insureds.
7 See supra notes 6676 and accompanying text.
'" Charter Oil Co. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 69 F.3d 1160, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
10 See supro text accompanying note 79.
170 612 S.W.2d at 392.
171 Id. at 394.
172 Rouggly v. Whitman, 592 S.W.2d 516, 521 (Mo. C1. App. 1979).
173 Id. at 518-21.





Missouri court reviewing the same issue
would get a more suitable result by adopt-
ing the rule as it applies to normal con-
tracts: that redundancy is one of the
factors that may be considered when inter-
preting a contract, along with intent of the
parties, but not the overriding concern.
This might especially be true when consid-
ering that insurance contracts in many ju-
risdictions, including Missouri, are
contracts of adhesion that are to be con-
strued in the light most favorable to the
non-drafting party. Here, the insureds
considered themselves indemnified for un-
intentional pollution occurrences. While it
is true that the words "sudden" and
"accidental" are redundant, perhaps that
factor should not be significant enough to
overwhelm the rules on contracts of adhe-
sion and extrinsic evidence at the time of
drafting.
One commentator also points out that
courts have teamed an anti-redundancy
interpretation with a misreading of which
event should under go the "sudden and
accidental" analysis to get a "clear mis-
reading" of the clause." His argument
is that the line of cases, descended from
Peerless, that find that the words must add
a temporal element or otherwise be redun-
dant, is based on a misreading of the
clause from Peerless.iso The author ar-
gues that, following a case that was to
"sound the death knell" of the pollution
exclusion, there was a backlash by courts
in interpreting the clause more strictly than
any court, commentator, or even insur-
ance company had thought of before.'
Peerless was part of that backlash.'82 The
Peerless court failed to disting
"occurrence," the harmless du
the subsequent dangerous see
the environment, it was referrin
so came to the erroneous concl
the insureds must be held lial
court based that ruling on the co
ing of a temporal element in th
similar to the court in the inst
based on the sudden/a
redundancy.
At the trial level, General
found for the insureds. Seemingl
difference between the trial cou
ion and the case on appeal is t
late court's use of the anti-red
rule. Thus, all of the elements cit(
trial court were overwhelmed by
redundancy rule. For example,
court pointed out that extrinsic evi
actions at the time of contracting
included to interpret a contract,18
surance contracts are construed
sured's favor when ambiguity ari
exclusion that would limitinsured
ery, 1" and that the drafting histo
clause evidenced the insurance
intent for the clause to exclude a
tended pollution.'8 However, thE
did not mention many of these E
Instead the appellate court took th
rule that, despite other evidence
insureds, that the clause should
preted based on whether two
the contract was to be interprete
on the anti-redundancy canon.
One arguing for a change o
Missouri would also encounter is
surance company representations
" Id
" Ballard and Manus, supro note 38, at 640.
80 Id.
181 Id. at 638.
182 Id. at 640.
" Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 783 F. Supp. 1199, 1208 (citing Press Machinery Corp. v. Smith R.P.M. Corp., 727 F.2d 781,784-785 (8th Cir. 1984); Tri-Lakes Newspapers, Inc. v. Logan, 713 S.W.2d 891, 893 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)) (holding that relevant matters outside theinsurance contract may be considered when interpreting insurance policies).
" Aetna, 783 F. Supp. at 1208 (citing See Meyer Jewelry Co. v. General Ins. Co., 422 S.W.2d 617, 623 (Mo. 1968); Greer v. Zurich Ins. Co., 441S.W.2d 15, 30 (Mo. 1969)) (stating that an insurance contract is designed to furnish protection and will, where reasonably possible, be construed to accomplishthis object).
85 Aetna, 783 F. Supp. at 1209.
i8 Monsanto Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 1993 WL 563253 at * 13 n 16 (Del. Super. Dec. 9, 1993).
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uish what time of the drafting of the clause, oft used
mping or against insurers, did not take piace in Mis-
page into souri. A Delaware case pointed out that
g to, and to hold the insurance companies on public
usion that policy grounds based on misrepresenta-
le. The tions to state regulators would be point-
urts read- less. This is because Morton, the New
e clause, Jersey case that found for the insureds on
ant case, the basis of misrepresentations before the
ccidental New Jersey regulatory. However, it is
unclear whether the same misrepresenta-
Dynamics tions were made to Missouri regulators. 1 6
y the only
rt's opin- V. CONCLUSION
he appel- Charter appears to be the continuation
undancy of the difficulty courts have had in inter-
ed by the preting the standard pollution exclusion in
the anti- contracts since the Eighties. However dif-
the trial ficult the decision, it is troubling that thedence of court would find for insureds in this case.
can be Based on the general rule that insurance
3 that in- contracts are to be generally construed to
in the in- favor insureds, the Charter result is unnec-
ses in an essarily harsh. The insureds in this case
's recov- asked a third party to dispose of their
ry of the waste, assuming that he would do so
board's properly. Bliss failed to do so. This is not
nly unin- a case of moral hazard. PC did not think
appeal they could bury their own tainted oil with-
lements. out fear because insurance would cover
e shorter them. Though we might be able to justify
for the insureds responsibility for cleanup in this
be inter- case, the fact that PC must know cover
yords in cleanup costs without the guard of insur-
d based once, is wrong. insurance that they must
have assumed that they obtained in thef law in 19 80's.
that in-
at the
